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Shadow	battles	and	empty	spaces:	What	the	conflict
between	Armenia	and	Azerbaijan	tells	us	about
disinformation	and	digital	history
The	military	conflict	between	Armenia	and	Azerbaijan	over	Nagorno-Karabakh	has	generated	headlines	across	the
world.	Yet	as	Elise	Thomas	explains,	a	parallel	battle	has	also	been	fought	between	the	two	sides	online.	She
argues	that	better	research	is	required	to	understand	the	spread	of	disinformation	during	armed	conflicts,
particularly	as	material	is	often	removed	by	social	media	sites	before	it	can	be	documented	by	researchers.
In	2020,	armed	conflicts	are	frequently	accompanied	by	a	ferocious	battle	being	played	out	online	for	control	over
the	narrative.	Social	media	has	emerged	as	a	key	vector	for	influencing	the	perceptions	of	ordinary	people	around
the	world,	but	also	and	perhaps	more	importantly	for	shaping	international	media	coverage.	Cash-strapped	media
organisations	compensate	for	journalists	on	the	ground	with	images,	video	and	information	from	social	media.	Their
coverage,	in	turn,	is	likely	to	play	a	role	in	informing	policy	decisions	and	in	shaping	the	broader	geopolitical
response	to	the	conflict.	The	shadow	wars	playing	out	online	are	therefore	an	increasingly	significant	element	of	the
conflict	itself.
However,	these	information	battles	are	often	poorly	documented,	and	as	a	result	are	poorly	understood.	There	are
a	couple	of	factors	driving	this,	which	a	recent	report	that	my	colleague	Albert	Zhang	and	I	wrote	over	the	course	of
a	few	days	at	the	beginning	of	the	latest	outbreak	of	violence	in	the	ongoing	conflict	between	Armenia	and
Azerbaijan	helps	to	illustrate.
The	online	dimension	to	the	Nagorno-Karabakh	conflict
Just	hours	after	hostilities	broke	out	between	the	two	countries	over	the	disputed	region	of	Nagorno-Karabakh	on
27	September,	hashtags	related	to	the	conflict	began	to	trend	on	Twitter.	This	was	how	I,	and	undoubtedly	many
others,	first	became	aware	of	the	conflict.	Even	as	I	was	looking	at	these	hashtags,	however,	I	could	see	tweets	and
entire	accounts	disappearing	before	my	eyes	as	Twitter’s	content	moderators	swung	into	action	and	began
removing	the	duelling	inauthentic,	potentially	bot	accounts	which	were	retweeting	and	boosting	hashtags	on	both
sides.
To	be	clear,	this	is	what	Twitter	should	do.	Removing	coordinated	inauthentic	activity	is	a	key	responsibility	of	the
social	media	platforms,	especially	when	it	comes	to	contentious	issues	such	as	an	extremely	complex	international
conflict.	Once	Twitter	had	determined	that	the	content	was	likely	to	be	a	part	of	an	information	operation	connected
to	the	conflict,	removing	that	content	was	undoubtedly	the	right	and	responsible	course	of	action.
However,	for	disinformation	researchers,	conflict	analysts	and	ultimately	for	historians,	this	presents	a	dilemma.
These	digital	artefacts	–	the	accounts,	the	tweets,	the	images	and	videos	and	hashtags	–	are	a	part	of	the	conflict.
When	they’re	removed,	often	that	data	is	simply	lost	to	researchers,	and	our	ability	to	fully	understand	what
happened	goes	with	it.	The	deletions	may	make	it	impossible	to	track	back	exactly	where	a	particular	piece	of
disinformation	originated	or,	on	the	other	side,	frustrate	the	ability	to	gather	evidence	of	potential	war	crimes	and
human	rights	abuses.
This	is	why	my	colleague	and	I	felt	it	was	necessary	to	set	aside	other	projects	and	scramble	to	collect	and	analyse
at	least	some	of	the	social	media	activity	linked	to	the	conflict	in	the	initial	days	after	clashes	broke	out.	In	a	week,
or	three	months,	or	a	year,	the	data	will	have	had	many	systematic	holes	punched	in	it	by	content	moderation	and
other	factors,	and	these	holes	will	skew	the	results	of	any	later	research	or	analysis.	Capturing	data	in	near	real-
time	is	crucial	in	order	to	support	the	accuracy	of	any	future	research.
Obstacles	to	disinformation	research
The	speed	at	which	evidence	degrades	is	one	of	the	factors	behind	why	these	shadow	conflicts	are	poorly
understood.	The	other	is	simple,	but	fundamental:	it’s	not	clear	who	should	pay	for	it.
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Disinformation	research	is	a	growing,	but	still	small	field.	Outside	of	academia,	most	organisations	doing	this	kind	of
research	work	on	a	project-based	funding	model.	The	upshot	of	this	is	a	lot	of	research	on	the	regions	and	issues
which	funders	are	interested	in	(for	example,	Russian	or	Chinese	disinformation	or	US	election	interference)	and
severely	limited	research	on	a	vast	swathe	of	the	rest	of	the	world.
We	were	lucky	to	be	able	to	undertake	our	research	into	the	Nagorno-Karabakh	conflict,	in	that	we	are	permitted	to
do	a	certain	amount	of	unfunded	work	and	the	outbreak	of	hostilities	happened	to	occur	during	a	window	of	time
when	we	had	no	immediately	looming	deadlines	for	funded	work.	If	it	had	come	a	week	or	two	earlier,	we	would
probably	not	have	been	able	to	do	this	report	at	all	and	much	of	the	data	we	collected	would	simply	never	have
been	recorded	or	analysed.
This	continues	to	be	the	case	for	many	other	issues	and	conflicts	around	the	world.	The	massive,	months-long
information	war	between	India	and	Pakistan	over	Kashmir;	the	sometimes	joyous,	sometimes	riotous,	always
fascinating	dynamics	of	social	media	in	African	countries,	from	the	#EndSARS	movement	in	Nigeria	to
#Shutitalldown	in	Namibia	or	#Congoisbleeding	in	Congo;	the	steadily	rising	temperature	of	the	social	media
conversation	around	Kosovo;	even	the	ongoing	Turkish-linked	campaign	against	the	PKK	and	YPG	in	northern
Syria.	These	are	fraught,	highly	contested	issues	with	historical	significance,	and	yet	key	pieces	of	those	digital
histories	slip	away	day	by	day.
In	some	cases,	journalists	do	their	best	to	cover	this	social	media	battle,	but	this	in	itself	can	be	a	complicated	task.
As	mentioned	above,	journalists	are	often	themselves	the	target	of	such	activity,	and	can	unwittingly	convey	exactly
the	message	that	inauthentic	influence	campaigns	are	intended	to	spread.	Even	where	journalists	are	alert	to	the
risks	of	disinformation	or	inauthentic	efforts	to	influence	their	coverage,	their	reporting	rarely	includes	large-scale
efforts	to	capture	or	analyse	data	(although	the	growing	use	of	data	journalism	holds	out	some	hope	for	this	in	the
future).
This	is	a	difficult	needle	to	thread.	The	social	media	companies	have	a	responsibility	to	remove	efforts	to	use	their
platforms	to	artificially	distort	or	manipulate	perceptions	and	narratives,	in	particular	where	it	comes	to	issues	such
as	armed	conflicts.	At	the	same	time,	those	efforts	at	information	warfare	are	a	part	of	modern	conflict,	and
evidence	about	when	and	how	they	were	conducted	has	both	analytical	and	historic	value.	It	is	not	impossible	to
capture	that	data	at	the	time,	but	currently	in	practice	it’s	difficult	and	ad	hoc,	as	the	funding	model	which	underpins
most	non-academic	disinformation	research	simply	does	not	support	this	work	for	many	issues	and	conflicts.
One	option	might	be	for	the	social	media	platforms	to	adapt	the	approach	which	Facebook	and	Twitter	have	taken
to	foreign	influence	operations.	When	Facebook	or	Twitter	dismantle	a	network	linked	to	a	foreign	influence	effort,
they	may	preserve	that	dataset	and	share	it	with	researchers	for	analysis	(and	sometimes	later	make	all	or	part	of
that	dataset	publicly	available).
It	is	possible	to	imagine	something	similar	for	analysing	social	media	activity	related	to	specific	conflicts	or
geopolitical	incidents.	Researchers	could	mix	the	dataset	of	removed	activity	back	in	with	the	activity	which	was	not
removed	in	order	to	have	a	relatively	complete	picture	of	what	actually	occurred	in	the	crucial	minutes	and	hours
after	an	airstrike,	for	example,	or	after	tanks	roll	into	a	disputed	area.
Almost	everything	is	easier	in	theory	than	in	practice,	and	there	will	be	flaws	and	complexities	to	work	out.	It	is
clear,	however,	that	this	is	a	conversation	which	needs	to	start	happening	amongst	researchers	both	inside	and
outside	the	academic	community,	amongst	the	social	media	platforms	and	amongst	potential	funders	who	would
support	this	work	in	the	interests	of	accurate	conflict	analysis,	and	in	the	interests	of	history.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	by	u	j	e	s	h	on	Unsplash
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